Congested public goods : the case of fire protection / BEBR No. 577 by Brueckner, Jan K.

UNIVERSITY Of
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AI URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
STACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/congestedpublicg577brue

Faculty Working Papers
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at U rb a n a - C h a m p a I g n

FACULTY WORKING PAPERS
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
June 11, 1979
CONGESTED PUBLIC GOODS: THE CASE OF
FIRE PROTECTION
Jan K. Brueckner, Assistant Professir,
Department of Economics
#577
Summary:
For a pure public good, individual consumption is insensitive to the size of the
consuming group, holding public good output fixed. Host publicly-provided goods, however,
are subject to congestion; consumption falls, holding output fixed, as the number of
consumers increases. In this paper, the strength of congestion for municipal fire pro-
tection is measured by regressing a proxy for the consumption of protection (the municipal
fire insurance rating) on a fire suppression capacity measure and population. The r.-.-uJrs
results suggest that the congestion properties of fire protection are much like those of
a pure public good. In addition, a new notion of returns to scale for local public goods
is developed, and evidence on returns to scale for fire protection is presented.

Congested Public Goods: The Case
of Fire Protection
by
Jan K. Bruecfcner^
While indlvidtial consxnnptlon of a Samuelsonlan pure public good is
insensitive to the size of the consuming group, some recent empirical work
in local public finance realistically incorporates congestion effects:
individual public good consumption falls, holding public sector resoixrces
fixed, as the size of the consviming group increases. In two Important
recent papers in this Review , Bergstrom and Goodman (B-G) and Borcherdlng
and Deacon (B-D) attempted, among other things, to estimate the strength
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of congestion for various public goods. Both papers postulated that
the consumption level of a public good equals Xn , where X is a measure
of public output, n is the size of the consuming group, and y ^ 0. Both
papers assumed in addition that as a result of a majority voting process,
public good consumption in a community is set at the level desired by
the voter with the median income. A public good demand function was
then used to derive an estimating equation relating public expenditure
to a community's median income level, population, and other variables.
The congestion parameter y was estimated by a non-linear function of
the regression coefficients from this equation.
While this procedure has the advantage that It permits estimation
of Y without direct meaourenent of the level of consumption of the public
good, it may lead to serious error. First, If the median voter model is
a faulty representation of the public choice process at the local level,
conclusions about public good congestion based on the eirpirical results
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are invalid. Second, even when the median voter model is appropriate,
if the public good deaand funct5.on does not have the constant-elasticity
form imposed in both papers, then the estimating eqtiations will be mis-
specified, complicating the interpretation of the empirical results.
The present study eliminates these possible sources of error by using a
proxy for public good consumption to directly estimate the technological
relationship between constnnption, public good output, and population.
The paper studies niunicrlpal fire cervices and uses a community's fire
insurance rating as a proxy for public consunrption, which is taken to
be the level of fire protection enjoysd by community residents. The
sapirical results sugg3st that the congestion properties of fire pro-
tection are close to those of a pure public good. In addition, the
paper introduces a n'^w notion of returns to scale for public goods and
provides evidence on returns to scale for fire protection.
Section I presents a geaerp.i model of a congested public good.
Section II extends the model tc the fire protection case, and Section
III presents and analyses the empirical results.
I. A General Model
The most general form of the exprecsion giving the consumption level
of a congested public good is
. ; z = f(X,n,S), (1)
where z is consumption, X ±c public good "capi<city," a measure of physical
output, n is the consuming group size, and S is a vector of environmental
variables which affect the consumption level afforded by a given capacity.
In the case of public parks, for exariple, S could include a measure of
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clijsate conditions, which clearly affect the benefits afforded by a given
park capacity. In the case of fire protection, S will be an index of
fire hazards. Note that (1) implicitly requires identical consinnption
of the public good by all members of the constnaing group. Unfortunately,
models where public consumption may be unequal (see Oakland) are too
complicated for empirical testing. Equal consumption appears in any
case to be a fairly realistic assumption.
Public good congestion Implies f^ 5. 0, and since a larger 'Ol.-
capacity raises consumption, other things equal, f. > 0. A likely
range for the strength of congestion effects emerges from considering
the elasticity of consumption with respect to n for the polar cases of
private and pure public goods. Ignoring S for the moment, a publicly^
provided private good which is divided equally among members of the
consuming group satisfies z » X/a. In this case, the elasticity of con-
sumption with respect to n or "elasticity of congestion," which is given
by —
-r—, equals -1, A one percent increase in the group size reduces
z on
consumption by one percent, holding capacity fixed. For a pure public
good, z = X and the elasticity of congestion equals zero. It seems
reasonable to suppose that all publicly-provided goods have congestion
properties which are Intermediate between the extreme cases of private
and pure public goods. Letting y denote the congestion elasticity
g
nf2
— T— = —T—, which depends in general on X, n, and S, this assumption
z on t
means -1 <^ y ^ 0.
A natural notion of returns to scale for local public goods also
emerges from (1) . Assuming that f is homogeneous of degree k in X and
[increasing]
n, the public good will exhibit <^constant > "returns to scale in
Idecreaslng
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increases
consinaption" as k — 0, neaning that consumption stays constant} when
[decreases
X and n are increased by the sajne proportion. T'Jhile the specification
z = Xn used by B-G and B-D iii5>lies non-decreasing returns to scale in
consumption when -1 ^ y f. 0, the more general framework used here does not
rule out decreasing returns. It is interesting to note that the degree
of returns to scale in consumption tells how public consumption varies
with community population when per capita public good capacity is held
constant. This follows because X/n = v means consumption may be written
k (increase 1
f (vn,n,S) «= n f(v,l,S). Consumption will \stay constant) with the
[decrease J
size of the community, holding X/n fixed, as k — 0.
It Is important to realize that returns to scale in consumption and
returns to scale in the production of public good capacity are unrelated
concepts. The latter issue must be considered, however, in deriving an
3
estimating equation from (1), as will become clear shortly.
II. The Case of Fire Protection
The adequacy of fire protection in municipalities in many states
is evaluated by the Insurance Services Office (ISO) . The resulting mun-
icipal fire insurance rating is an important determinant of the fire
insurance premiums paid by property owners. In a competitive insurance
market, premiums for a structxare should bear a close relationship to
expected fire losses. The use of the ISO rating in computing premiums
indicates that it Is a predictor of expected losses and hence a measure
of a community's level of fire protection. The rating is computed by
comparing the characteristics of a community's fire departtaent, water
supply, and fire communications system, as well as its level of fire
hazards, to ideal standards. Deficiency points are subtracted from an
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Inltlal point total for shortcomings In each category. The fire depart-
ment and water supply each account for 39% of the total possible defi-
ciency points, while fire communications and fire hazards account for
9% and 13% respectively. Communities are rated on a one to ten scale
on the basis of their point score, with a higher ninnber Indicating a
poorer rating. This Inverse relationship was reversed by constructing
an index of fire protection egttal to ten minus the ISO rating. This
index is used to represent z In the empirical work.
The method of computation of the ISO rating indicates that a com-
munity's ability to suppress fires depends jointly on the characteris-
tics of its water supply and fire department. A modern, well-staffed .
fire department may be relatively Ineffective in a community with poor
water pressure, while the fire fighting ability of a poorly-operated
fire department may be enhanced by a water system which permits the
use of large quantities of water at the scene of a fire. Accordingly,
it is assumed that a community's fire suppression capacity X is given
by
X = G{F,W), (2)
where F represents fire department pumping capacity, VJ represents the
delivery capacity of the water supply system, and G , G- >_ 0. It will
be assumed that G exhibits constant returns to scale; doubling F and
W doubles fire suppression capacity. As will be seen below, this as-
simption simplifies the discussion of returns to scale in consumption.
While direct observation of F and W is usually impossible, water supply
and fire department expenditures are readily available and can be used
to deduce the levels of F and W, Assuming that fire department pumping
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capaclty la produced using inputs of capital and labor and that fire
departmentH miniiEise the cost of providing a given level of pumping
capacity, then fire department expenditures, FEX, are given by
jfEX - C(F,p), (3)
where C is the cost fimction for pumping capacity and p is the wage of
fire fight«irs. Since the price of fire department capital inputs will
be approxinately unlfornj across coEsmunities, it need not appear explicit-
ly in the cost function. It is interesting to note that while substi-
tution pos£iibilities between labor and capital in the production of pump-
ing capacity appear to be lixaited, fire departments are able to economize
on labor inputs by under-ioanning their eompenies, a practice vhich is
noted by the ISO in assigning deficiency points. Another point is that
it taay be unrealistic to model a government agency as a cost-ainimizer.
Unfortunattily, even though the pressrire to keep costs low may be relatively
vesk in local governHient, it is invpossible to deduce capacity levels from
available data without the assuffipticn of cost-minimization,
Assucd.ng that water supply capacity is produced with capital end
labor, wat«'.r supply expenditures, WEX, are given by
' lEX = H(W,q), (4)
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where H is the cost function and q is the wage o£ water supply workers.
Since C., IL > 0, (3) and (4) la&y be inverted to yield F = C(FEXs,p) and
W = HCWESjc;). Letting both p and q be represented by the average wage
for local f;ovemsiient workers, y, for which data are available, (2) ©ay
be written
-7-
X = GCC(FEX,y), H(WEX,y)). (5)
Substituting in (1) yields
2 « f(G[C(FEX,y), n(WEX,y)], n, S), (6)
an equation which contains only observable variables.
While a regression based on (6) will yield an estimate of the elas-
ticity of congestion, estimating the degree of retuims to scale in con-
sumption requires the further assiimption of constant returns in the
production of both fire department and water supply capacity. Under
these assumptions, FEX = c(y)X and WEX = h(y)X, giving
z = f(G[FEX/c(y), WEX/hCy)], n, S) (7)
= L(FEX, WEX, n, y, S).
Since G exhibits constant returns to scale, increasing FEX and WEX by a
given proportion results in an equal proportional increase in X. Conse-
quently, the degree of homogeneity of L in FEX, WEX, and n gives the
degree of homogeneity of f in X and n, which is the degree of returns
to scale in consumption. Although constant returns in the production of
capacity is a strong assumption, the degree of returns to scale in con-
sumption cannot be deduced from regression results without it. B-G and
B-D also found it necessary to assume that public good capacity is pro-
duced with constant returns.
In the next section, results from estimating
z = aFEx" WEX^ n^ y^ S* (8)
are reported. This equation may be derived by asst2ai.ng f (X,n,S) =
AX ^n ^S ^s G(F,W) = 3F^ \^~^ ^ F »= DLjri;"'^, and W « TL^"'^, where
Kp, L_j K^- and L^. are capital and labor inputs for fire and water
supply capacity, and all pariunecers except b^ are positive. Tha fire
and water supply cost functions are proportional to Fy and Wy , respec-
tively, and substitution yields (8). In particular j a = b.d > 0,
$ = b, (1-d) > 0, Y = b„ < 0, e « -b, (dm + (l-d)r) < 0, and 6 « b,,
which is positive when S is taken to be a decreasing measure of fire
hazard. Note that y is the elasticity of congestion and that
s+g+Y°b, +b« givea the degree of returns to scale in consumption.
Intuition suggests that fire protection exhibits substantial public-
ness, implying that Y ought to lie closer to zero than to -1, This
seems likely because fire suppression capacity is used relatively infre-
quently, with fire departtaent equipment and personnel sitting idle much
of the time. Thus, increasing the size of a community while holding its
fire suppression capacity fixed should not saarkedly decrease the level of
protection provided to each resident. Intuition, does not seem similarly
capable of predicting the degree ef returns to scale in consumption.
III. Empirical Results
Data on FEX, y, and n were taken frcsa the 1972 Censtis of Govern-'
cents . This source also gives murticipal water supply expenditures
broken down into current operating expenditures, expenditures for capi-
tal improvements J and debt ser^/ice. The last two components vary er-
ratically across communities, presumably as a result of the cyclical
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nature of new construction and differences in age and financing methods
among water supply systems. The Ifevel of current operating expenditures
appeared therefore to be the most reliable indicator of effective water
supply expenditure, and consequently it was used to represent WEX.
The fire hazard component of the ISO rating is principally based
on the extent of industrial fire hazards, the nature and enforcement of
building laws and heating and ventilation regulations, and the scope of
preventive building inspections. Since direct data on such variables
are not generally available, the search for a hazard index was restricted
to variables thought to measure the fire-worthiness of a community's
housing stock. The three variables considered were the fraction of a ' *
community's 1970 dwelling units constructed before 1939, the fraction ;
of 1960 units that were sound with all pliambing facilities (this var- • •
'
iable unfortunately was not computed in the 1970 Census of Housing) , '-'
and the fraction of 1970 units with less than 1.01 persons per room.
The last variable, which measures the extent of crowding in the housing
stock and presumably assumes a low value in communities with relatively
large proportions of run-down housing, was significant with the correct
sign in all the regressions. Since the first two variables were never
significant and their inclusion had a negligible effect on the estimated
coefficients of the other variables, the regressions reported below use
7 8
the crowding variable as the only measure of fire hazard. '
Since only current fire insurance ratings are available from the
Insurance Services Office, the fire protection index used in the re-
gressions is based on 1978 ratings. However, since changes in a com-
munity's rating occur infrequently, the 1978 ratings can be used with
1972 expenditure data without serious error.
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The sample contains 100 communities with populations exceeding
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30,000 in the states of Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan,
Small communities were deleted because they are likely to have all- or
partly-volunteer fire departments, with the result that fire department
expenditures no longer bear a close relationship to department capacity.
The reasonableness of the population cutoff point of 30,000 is suggested
by detailed fire department personnel data from Texas, one of the few
states which collects such information. In 1972, Texas had 39 cities
with populations above 30,000, and of these, only five had fire depart-
ments with volunteer personnel. Three were roughly half-volunteer, half-
paid, one was mostly-volunteer, and one was all-volunteer. While the
frequency of volunteer fire departments in the Midwest may be different
than in Texas, deleting cities below 30,000 should generate a sample
with few all- or partly-volunteer fire departments.
Communities were also deleted from the sample if their water supply
system was operated by a private company, making water supply expenditure
data unavailable. Since the vast majority of communities operate their
own water supply systems, deletions for this reason were not extensive.
The first row of Table 1 gives the parameter estimates based on the
entire sample. The estimated coefficients indicate as expected that,
ceteris paribtis , the level of fire protection in a community increases
with level of fire and water expenditures and decreases as fire hazards
and population increase (recall that the crowding variable is a decreas-
A
ing measure of fire hazard). The magnitude of y, the estimate of elas-
ticity of congestion, is especially striking. The estimated value of
about -.24 indicates as predicted that fire protection has congestion
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properties more like those of a pure public good than a private good.
A 1/5 increase in comaunlty population causes approximately a 1/4% de-
erejise in the level of fire protections holding fire suppression capacity
and the level of fire hasards constant. Although the estimate of the
elassticity of congestion is negatives it is interesting to note that
the simple correlation between population and the fire protection index
is positive; large communities tend tn have better fire insurance ratings
11
than small ones. A 95% confidence Jjiterval tor y is contained in the
firtJt row of Table 2. VJhile the confidence interval is fairly wide, it
lien well to the right in the Inter^/al [-l»0]j indicating substantial
pub]!.lcness
.
The estimated wage coefficient, while negative, is -unfortunately
not significantly different froti aero, contradicting the prediction of
a negative wage affect. While this appears to violate the model , an
eaqjJ^nation may be that higher wages are associated with better labor
quaj.lty. Holding expenditures fixed, fire suppression capacity need not
fal]. as the wage increases if labor quality increases simxiltaneously.
The estimate of the degree of returns to scale in coixsumption,
A A A
a + 3 + Y, is significantly positive and equal to about .16, indicating
Increasing returns: eqvial proportional increases in fire suppression
capacity and population lead to an Increase in the level of fire pro-
tecl:ion. Or, holding per capita fire suppression capacity fixed, the
levtil of fire protection increases with the population of the community.
While the fire insurance ratings of all but two communities in the
sample are less tlian or equal to 6, with 4's and S's being most common.
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one small commtmity has a rating of 7 and another has a rating of 9,
one point away froia the worst possible rating. Deletion of the latter
community changes some of the estimated coefficients, as the second
row of Table 1 shows. The estimated elasticity of congestion rises
to about -oil, but the parameter is still significantly different
frottt zero. The most striking change is in the estimated the water
supply coefficient, which, while negative, is no longer significantly
different from zero. Although this change appears to contradict
the model, an explanation is suggested by the fact that the deleted
community's poor ina\arance rating was accompanied by extremely low
water supply expenditures. Deletion of the community eliminated the
positive association in the data between WEX and the fire protection
index, an outcome which makes sense under the supposition that the
extra fire suppression capacity afforded by additional water supply
capacity is zero in communities with reasonably good insurance ratings,
such as those in the restricted sample. In other words, it is likely
that water supply systems are good enough in these communities that
the marginal productivity of water supply capacity in fire suppression
equals zero, explaining the zero WEX coefficient for the restricted
sample. Inclusion in the sas^le of a community with a poor water
supply system, however, causes the regression to pick up the positive
effect of WEX on the fire protection index which is felt in communities
with poor water supply systems.
Further restriction of the sample to ccmmunities with pop\ilation6
exceeding 45,000 leads to qualitatively sliailar results, which are
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shown In the third row of Table 1, The signs of significant coefficients
ressain the same, with the point estimate of the congestion elasticity
falling to about -,19. Confidence intervals for y ^^ the two restricted
samples are contained in the second and third rows of Table 2, and their
location toward the right end of the interval [-1,0] further supports
the conclusion that the congestion properties of fire protection are
lauch like those of a pxire public good.
Since the loarginal productivity of vater supply capacity appears to
be zero in tho restricted samples » returns to scale in constinsptlon is
appropriately defined in terms of fire department capacity and population.
The sum of a and y thus gives the degrees of returns to scale In consump-
tion, with the estimates in the second and third rows of Table 1 indicat-
ing increasing returns. Increasing fire department capacity and popula-
tion by the saise proportion leads to a higher level of protection. Or,
holding per capita fire capacity (and thus per capita fire expenditures)
fixed, higher levels of protection are achieved in larger coBmunities.
These results on returns tc scale in consumption are consistent with
conclusions reached by Will, He costputed the per capita cost of provid-
ing a level of fire department capacity considered acceptable under
National Board of Fire Underwriters standards, regressed this variable
o-n poptilatlon, and viewed the resulting negative relationship as evidence
of what he called returns to scale. Since with Increasing returns in
consujnption, a given per capita fire expenditure yields a higher level
of protection in a larger community. Will's result that the ideal
NBFU protection level can be provided at lower per capita cost in a
larger community follows immediately. This consistency of results is
-14-
aot surprising in view of the fact the KEFU standards are used in coia-
puticg the ISC ratings.
Borcherding and Deacon esticated the congestion elasticity for fire
protection, and althoiigh tests of hypotheses about the parameter are not
canrpletely reliable becaiise the distribution of its esticiator is unknown,
the elasticity appears not to be significantly different fron -1.
This counter-intuitive conclusion, vhich says that fire protection has
congestion properties like those of a private good, is obviously at odds
12
«lth the above results."
IV. Conclusions
This study has provided the laost reliable evidence to date on the
congestion properties of a local public good. It h^s been shown that
fire protection exhibits substantial publicness, with 95% confidence in-
ten.-als for the elasticity of congestion lying well to the right in the
interval [-1,0], This result confonns well to intuition, which suggests
that because the deaands on fire suppression capacity are relatively in-
frequent, increa.sing a ccisnunity's population should not greatly reduce
the level of fire protection, holding suppression capacity fixed.
It has also been shown that fire protection exhibits increasing re-
tiims tc scale in consumption. TThen attention is restricted to communi-
ties with relatively good fire insurance ratings, this Tnenns that the
level of fire protection increases with the size of the coraaunity, hold-
ing per capita fire ei-rpenditures fized. It follows that a given level
of fire protection may be provided at a lower per capita cost in a
larger corcunity. Tt±s result is obviously extremely useful for long
range governcent planning in a growing coiastmity.
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Finally, the results in this paper bear on the issue of optimal city
size. The congestion properties of local public goods must be considersd
in any theoretical model where city population is chosen to maximize th*
welfare of urban residents. If local public goods exhibit a high degrea
of publicness, optimal size cities will be relatively large (see Alonso).
-16-
Footnotes
Assistant Professoi of Economics, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. I v/ish to thank Iferk Browning for several useful
discussions. Any rensaining errors are ray own.
Congestion effects also play a role in the specification of the
enpiricai models of Brueckner and Deacon,
""it should be noted that one coranon notion of returns to scale in
the onpirical literature bears no relation to either of the above re-
turns to scale concepts. Ilirsch (1959, 1968) and Rlew regress per capita
expenditure for various local public services on population and a variety
of other explanatory variables, viewing negative population coefficients
as evidence of what they call increasing returns to scale. Assinning
constant costs for capacity X, this procedure tells only how per capita
capacity varies with conmunity population and provides no evidence what-
soever about underlying technological relationships. With non-constant
capacity costs, the population coefficients have no clear interpretation
at all.
Walzer uses the less objectionable approach of regressing cost per
unit of police services on the level of police services and other vari-
ables. Since the police service measure is a composite index which in-
corporates both capacity and consttmption variables, the relation of
Walzer 's approach to the above is unclear.
Although the price of structure capital (fire stations) may
vary across commimities, the price of rolling stock and other equipment
is set in national markets.
While the price of some water supply capital inputs may vary
across communities, this is ignored in (4).
The multiplicative form of (6) is consistent with the computation
of the ISO rating since extra deficiency points are levied depending on
the extent of divergence between the qualities of the fire department
and water supply. Since a poor water supply, for example, is thought
to limit the contribution of the fire department, a multiplicative ex-
pression such as (6) is appropriate.
J
The lack of explanatory power of the age distribution variable
might follow from a weak relationship between the level of maintenance
of a community's housing stock and its age. The dilapidation measure
might be insignificant due to its use of 1960 data. Structures dilapi-
dated in 1960 may well have disappeared by 1972,
It should be noted that since fire fighting in high-rise buildings
requires advanced equipment, a given level of fire expenditures affords
less protection in a community of fixed size the greater the proportion
of high-rise structures. However, the number of high-rise buildings
will be roughly constant across communities of a given population.
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although it will Increase with communify size. We may therefore ignore
the frequency of high-rise buildings and treat the vertical growth of
a city which accompanies population gtcnath as just another cause of
congestion in fire protection.
Climate is an environmental variable which affects the fire pro-
tection afforded by a given fire suppression capacity since many fires
are caused by problems in furnaces. The unifomil.ty of climate in the
sample means its effect need not be considered.
Regressions using the insurance rating index compiled by the
Texas state government yielded very poor results, with none of the in-
dependent variables exhibiting any explanatory power.
It is interesting to note that deletion of Chicago, whose popu-
lation is nearly three times as large as the next largest city in the
sample (Detroit), does not substantially change the regression results.
12
In his study of the economics of fire protection, Ahlbrandt re-
gressed community per capita fire expenditure on population, the fire
insurance rating, and a host of other variables. Unfortunately, the
inclusion of independent variables such as assessed property value
and fire department characteristics makes Ahlbrandt's results inappro-
priate for answering the questions addressed in the present paper.
However, in a study of New York state school districts, Klesling
computed regressions which provide evidence on congestion and returns to
scale in consumption in education. Since he was not cognizant of the
theoretical issues discussed in the present paper, Klesling was not
aware of the following interpretation of his results. HIp procedure
was to regress a composite measure of student performance on standard-
ized tests (a measure of education consumption) on school district en-
rollment, expenditure per pupil, and an index of average student in-
telligence. The use of expenditure per student means that the coeffi-
cient of enrollment gives the degree of returns to scale in consumption
while the difference between the coefficients of expenditure per stu-
dent and enrollment gives the elasticity of congestion. The degree of
returns to scale is significantly negative, in contrast to the case of
fire protection, while the point estimate of the congestion elasticity
is considerably less than -1. It is not possible, however, to deduce
whether the elasticity is significantly different from -1 without more
statistical information than is provided in the paper.
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TABLE 2 - 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
FOR ELASTICITY OF CONGESTION
Interval d»f «
[-.3829, -.0929] 94
[-.2123, -.0163] 93
[-.3198, -.0558] 56
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